An Orthodox Critique of Severus of Antioch

This is an excerpt from a work in progress that deals with monophysitism from multiple angles. This excerpt contains an exposition of Severus of Antioch’s Christology, and then a refutation of his Christological beliefs. Some of the material that will feature in the work was omitted for the sake of brevity and a more in-depth treatment will be made when the full work comes out, but for the time being this, in my opinion, should be enough.

Severus of Antioch’s Christology Contra Chalcedon

Severus who was the patriarch of Antioch (512-518) is most known for his arguments against the Council of Chalcedon and defense for what is currently known today as the “Oriental Orthodox Church”. It is fair to refer to him as the “Thomas Aquinas of the Middle East” although a lot of his works did not survive, his theology was incredibly influential in the formation and development of Anti-Chalcedonian theology. His notable influences were the Cappadocians, St. Athanasius and most notably, St. Cyril of Alexandria. In fact it would be fair to say that his Christology is based on a very strict miaphysite reading of St. Cyril of Alexandria where he argues that St. Cyril’s Christology is fundamentally incompatible with Dyophysite Christology. The saying “the best theologian is he who with sophistication is trained in Aristotle’s Categories and in similar texts of outside philosophers’^[i] is attributed to him, whether he truly said that or not, Aristotelean categories have a very important place in the way Severus commentates on Cappadocian metaphysics. his writing aims to explain Severus’ Christology, how it differs from Chalcedonian Christology and patristic responses to his metaphysics.

The Council of Chalcedon’s main point is that Christ is one hypostasis in two natures, and the natures perform acts that are proper to it, that is when Christ does a human act, it is the human nature of Christ doing that activity and vice versa^[ii]. When we speak of Christ being crucified and suffering, we say that He suffered not in His divine nature but in His human nature^[iii]. At the same time, the two natures aren’t just merely united to each other but they are united hypostatically, that is they are united in the hypostasis of Christ^[iv].

But what do terms like “hypostasis” or “nature” even mean? Both sides have fundamentally different visions on how they view personhood, Severus’ views as we shall soon see have a very Aristotelean bent, although his inspiration is not merely from Aristotle, but from the Cappadocians themselves as well as St. Cyril of Alexandria, of whom he quotes extensively. It would be prudent to understand however that the way Severus reads the Cappadocians or St. Cyril does not necessarily mean that they say the same thing, one can quote the bible extensively and still present false doctrines.

The relationship between Hypostasis^[v] and Ousia^[vi] are no different than Particular and Universal for Severus of Antioch,^[vii] Ousia, that is the universal, is no other than the collection of particulars.^[viii] We can see that for Severus there is no real distinction between a universal and particular aside from the mode in which they exist.^[ix] This view arguably is implicit rather than explicit but expressed fully in the controversy between John Ascoutzanges and Theophilus of Alexandria in which John claims that the Trinity must not only be three hypostases but also three natures, in which his opponent Theophilus of Alexandria attempted to respond while refusing to consider nature and hypostasis distinct.^[x] Severus of Antioch for instance states that the hypostatic union is a union not of universals but particulars:

Accordingly we say that from it and the hypostasis of God the Word the ineffable union was made: for the whole of the Godhead and the whole of humanity in general were not joined in a natural union, but special hypostases.^[xi]

We can see then that according to Severus, to speak of two natures in Christ is essentially to speak of two particulars. We can see then why Severus considered the Chalcedonian position to be Nestorian since according to his particular vs. universal dichotomy, one would either have to speak of one nature and hypostasis or two natures and hypostases.

John the Grammarian^[xii] postulated that the two natures Chalcedon speaks of are not hypostases, but rather ousiai, therefore Christ is of universal humanity and divinity.

Severus’ response to this is very illuminating because he very clearly argues that to speak of two universal natures in Christ is incoherent and that it is more logical to say that Christ is one particular out of two particulars:

So then why, O grammarian, do you suppose that you will escape agreeing with Nestorius’ opinion, inasmuch as you affirm that you acknowledge Christ in two substances? For behold! He himself also (as you yourself observe) expounded the phrase ‘in two natures’ as ‘in two substances’. But if you take refuge in the generic signification by which we understand ‘substance’ as a compendium of many hypostases, then by the vanity of your reasoning you will be imprisoned in such folly and wickedness as to declare that the substance of the Holy Trinity was incarnate in the substance and in the whole genus of humanity, a matter which reason by much testing has proved.^[xiii]

To speak of two universal natures uniting in Christ is to say that all human and divine hypostases were united with each other as well. The irony here is that this argument was also made by Nestorius against St. Cyril of Alexandria:

Nonetheless, whatever the sophistication of his [Nestorius’] intentions, his stark reductio ad absurdum, ‘If God the Word became flesh then all the Trinity must have become flesh since the Trinity is bound together as one nature’ sounded in the popular forum (both at the street level and in the conciliar chamber where it was cited as evidence of his present state of mind since he would not attend to speak in his own defense) as capable of bearing only two possible interpretations. The first was that the Archbishop of Constantinople was theologically illiterate: did he, for example, really think that all the acts of the incarnation had to be referred to the eternal life of the Trinity? This would be a revival of the crassest form of pagan Hellenistic myth. The second possibility was that he knew this statement was an absurdity, and thus to avoid it was arguing simply that the one who became incarnate was not the Word of God, and therefore could only be a man. This was widely recognized as the heresy of Paul of Samosata condemned in the Third Century, and the very heresy which his own clergy had formally accused him of holding.^[xiv]

However, this does not mean that Severus does not have a (potential) answer to the charge that he refuses the double homoousion^[xv]. As stated before, Christ is out of two particular natures of divinity that pre-exists the union and humanity that exists in the union, and thus He is not merely any hypostasis that is God or man, but a composite hypostasis. Whenever Severus cites his reasoning for hypostatic composition and most of his other doctrines, he uses St. Cyril of Alexandria:

but that from the unmixed union of the Incarnation, and the composition out of two elements, the Godhead and the manhood, Emmanuel should be made up, who in one hypostasis is ineffably composite; not simple, but composite: as the soul of a man like us, which by nature is bodiless and rational, which is naturally intertwined with the body, remains in its suprasensual and bodiless nature, but by reason of the composition with the body makes up one composite animal, man. Accordingly the assumption of the body makes no addition to the essence of the soul, but makes up the composite animal, as it is reasonable to understand with regard to the theory of Emmanuel also. The Word did not take the flesh intelligently possessed of a soul in order to complete his being God, as we have said, but that one hypostasis might be wonderfully and immutably made up out of two elements, the Godhead we mean and the manhood, and the one incarnate nature of the Word himself, and one person: for the Word of God, according to the saying of Paul the apostle, partook of blood and flesh after our pattern. And that this is so the approved Cyril further shows in the letter to Valerian bishop of Iconium; who wrote as follows^[xvi]: ‘For God and man did not come together, as they say, and make up one Christ; but, as I have already said, the Word, being God, partook of blood and flesh like us, in order that he may be known to be God who was humanized, and who took our flesh, and made this his, because, as the man who was composed of soul and body is known to be one, so also now he is acknowledged to be one Son and Lord. For one nature and hypostasis of a man is acknowledged, though he is known to be made of diverse and heterogeneous elements: for the body is truly different in nature from the soul; but it belongs to it, and with it makes up the hypostasis of the one man. And in mental conception and in theory the difference of the things that have been named is not obscure, but by combination and concurrence that cannot be cut asunder one animal, man, is made up. The Word therefore, the Only one of God, did not come forth as man by taking a man, but, though his birth from the Father is ineffable, he became man by forming a man for himself through the Holy Spirit which is of one essence with him. Accordingly he is known to be one, though in the theory which is according to reason his own body is different in nature from himself. Let it therefore be everywhere acknowledged that he was not without soul, but that he was possessed of an intelligent soul.^[xvii]

It is undeniable not only in this text but in many other texts, Severus considers St. Cyril to at least be the main authority of his Christological beliefs, does this mean he is closer to St. Cyril than the Orthodox? Not necessarily so since St. Cyril in his letter to John of Antioch speaks of Christ as two natures:

For we know the theologians make some things of the Evangelical and Apostolic teaching about the Lord common as pertaining to the one person, and other things they divide as to the two natures, and attribute the worthy ones to God on account of the Divinity of Christ, and the lowly ones on account of his humanity [to his humanity].^[xviii]

In what way does St. Cyril distinguish the two natures in Christ? By distinguishing them according to the “eye of the soul” this for him means there’s a conceptual distinction of the two natures after the union.

As to the manner of the incarnation of the Only Begotten, then theoretically speaking (but only in so far as it appears to the eye of the soul) we would admit that there are two united natures but only one Christ and Son and Lord, the Word of God made man and made flesh.^[xix]

The key question then becomes, what is a conceptual distinction? As stated before, the Orthodox viewpoint differs on this from the Severan view. For Severus of Antioch, a conceptual distinction is nothing other than mentally dividing something that is one in reality into two.

Now once again Cyril, wise in spirit, at the same time illuminates and confirms the matter for us; since he demonstrates that, when by subtle contemplation alone we distinguish those things out of which exists the one and sole Christ, we affirm that there was a natural coming together of two natures or hypostases; but when with distinction and division (perceived) as by contemplation we accept that union, we no longer affirm ‘two’ after the reckoning of the union, because they do not subsist separately and in their particular subsistencies, but out of the two exists one nature and hypostasis of the Word who is incarnate.^[xx]

For Severus Christ is one nature in reality, two natures in an illusory sense insofar as we mean that He is from two natures, but not in two natures, in other words, He is composed of two natures but is not two natures after the union. He attempts to argue this by citing St. John Chrysostom, St. Cyril of Alexandria, and St. Gregory the Theologian who speak of Christ as “double” but then say that is because He is from two natures, arguing that Christ is double in the sense that He is from two natures, but not double after the union.^[xxi] This is further evidenced not only by his rejection of duality in Christ on the grounds that duality is division,^[xxii] but also that the union of particulars of different substances forms one nature.^[xxiii] Is this what St. Cyril is saying concerning Christ, that in Him is a union of particulars that become the same kind of a particular and nothing else? The analogy of body and soul being applied to Christ where the two natures become one is used by St. Cyril,^[xxiv] it seems then that this classic Orthodox prooftext from his response to John of Antioch is not inconsistent with the miaphysite interpretation of him… or is it?

The idea of two natures being conceptually distinguished precedes St. Cyril. St. Gregory the Theologian also distinguishes the two natures of Christ conceptually

And an indication of this is found in the fact that wherever the Natures are distinguished in our thoughts from one another, the Names are also distinguished; as you hear in Paul’s words, “The God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of Glory.” The God of Christ, but the Father of glory. For although these two terms express but one Person, yet this is not by a Unity of Nature, but by a Union of the two. What could be clearer?^[xxv]

For St. Gregory the Theologian names of God which direct us to His energies are also conceptually distinguished from one another.

Our position, however, is, that as in the case of a horse, or an ox, or a man, the same definition applies to all the individuals of the same species, and whatever shares the definition has also a right to the Name; so in the very same way there is One Essence of God, and One Nature, and One Name; although in accordance with a distinction in our thoughts we use distinct Names and that whatever is properly called by this Name really is God; and what He is in Nature, That He is truly called — if at least we are to hold that Truth is a matter not of names but of realities.^[xxvi]

We can see then for St. Gregory the Theologian, conceptual distinction is not only Christological, but also related to the Trinity, the Trinitarian context of conceptual distinction will help us understand how St. Cyril uses conceptual distinction for the persons in the Trinity, this is particularly important since now we have a strong proof that conceptual distinction are not a purely mental distinction, but at times can refer to real things that are being distinguished, and although they are distinct in conception, they at the same time are distinct in reality too.

I am in the Father and the Father in me^[xxvii] As if the sweetness of the honey when laid on the tongue should say of itself, I am in the honey and the honey in me; or as though again the heat that proceeds naturally from fire, emitting a voice were to say, I am in the fire and the fire in me. For each of the things mentioned is I suppose divisible in idea, but one in nature, and the one proceeding by a sort of indivisible and continuous forthcome from the other, so as to seem to be even severed from that wherein it is. Yet though the force of ideas regarding these things takes this form, still one appears in the other and both are the same as regards essence.^[xxviii]

Leontius of Jerusalem tackles the issue of conceptual distinction, following St. Cyril and St. Gregory, he elaborates further on in what sense we can speak of the two natures as distinct and why we do so:

Those who say they recognize the duality of natures in Christ after the union only in thought must tell us this: is it in thought that they recognize the natural difference between the invisible and the visible in Christ, or not in thought but in some other way? If they also recognize the natural difference in the same Christ by this same thought, logically they’ll have to confess one natural difference in exactly the same way as they confess the other—or if one is a figment of the imagination, they’ll say the other is one too. If, on the other hand, they say that it’s not in thought that they discern the difference, but by sense-perception itself, they’ll find themselves the objects of astonishment for maintaining so strongly that they observe what’s invisible by sense-perception!^[xxix]

Leontius insightfully points out one of the key differences between Orthodox conceptual distinction and Severan conceptual distinction, Leontius posits that conceptual distinction is necessary for the two natures of Christ because one of the natures, that is the divine, is invisible! This helps us understand why St. Cyril conceptually distinguishes between the Father and the Son, since the two divine persons are invisible, we can distinguish two persons only conceptually since we are unable to know them via sense-perception. Dr. David Bradshaw points out that conceptual distinction in the Church Fathers have an epistemological nature to it

What all this shows is that to speak of two things as distinct kat’ epinoian is taken alone not an ontological statement at all. It is an epistemological statement in that it identifies the means by which we conceive or recognize the two things as distinct that is through reflection rather than sense experience as we saw earlier this had been the basic meaning of the term ever since antiquity. Confusion enters because the term epinoia  is also used in statements that do have ontological significance as when something is said to be conceived by bare epinoia meaning in the imagination or to exist in epinoia and not in reality. Careful attention must be paid to the specific locution and context to discern the meaning in each case.^[xxx]

There is a very clear difference between the Orthodox and the Severans on the nature of conceptual distinction, one side considers the distinction to be purely mental whereas the other states that it is not always so, at times it can be a real distinction, just that it can only be known conceptually, rather than through sense experience. The debate against Eunomius from the Cappadocians, particularly that of St. Basilis important, because for the Cappadocians, names are conceptions that are realities and that they are not substances but rather point to energies.^[xxxi] If we took the Severan reading of St. Basil then, they would end up saying the same thing, yet St. Basil is insistent that Eunomius’ understanding of conception is heretical. Although dealing with completely different subjects, it is important to note that Severans agree with Eunomius on this topic, whereas the Orthodox agree with St. Basil and the other Cappadocians.

Duality Divided: How Severus Speaks of “Twoness”

“Duality is a dissolver of unity” – Severus of Antioch^[xxxii]

Severus considers all speech of duality to imply division, to speak of anything that is dual in Christ is to say that Christ is two separate things in reality and this applies not only to the natures of Christ but also its faculties, this is why Christ has to be composed of particulars and only considered to be one nature. Chesnut’s summary of Severus’ idea of hypostatic composition is very important:

From the section on hypostasis we recall that the prime example of this type of union is that of body and soul to make up one man. These things, then, characterize a ‘natural’ or ‘hypostatic’ union: First, the two elements ‘differ in kind’ from one another, and are not of our ousia, like body and soul, humanity and divinity. After the union, although the two hypostases remain, they have no individual, separate existence of their own, just as soul and body do not exist apart. after the union, there is only one countable entity: if we are looking at Peter and somebody says, ‘how many do you see?’, we always say ‘one’. The two components in the union bear only one name between them-Peter, Paul, Christ, or the Incarnate Word. There is only one history referred to the end product of the union. There is only one centre of activity, one source of operation out of which arise all the actions of the one prosopon. [xxxiii]

How the Anti-Chalcedonians view hypostatic union is thus fundamentally different compared to the Orthodox, instead of believing that there are two natures hypostatically united, their belief states that there’s a union of hypostases:

Accordingly we say that from it and the hypostasis of God the Word the ineffable union was made: for the whole of the Godhead and the whole of humanity in general were not joined in a natural union, but special hypostases.^[xxxiv]

Severus rejects the idea of two universal natures in Christ, instead, there is only one particular nature out of two natures. The way it is understood is fundamentally based on the body-soul analogy, when we speak of a human hypostasis, we do not speak of him as two hypostases which are body and soul, but one human person that is composed of body and soul. When the human person drinks we do not say the body drank but the person drank. Similarly, Severus abhors the idea that the natures act in Christ, it is always the person, it is the person which operates and therefore Christ not only has one nature but also one energy, in contrast, Pope St. Leo in his tome argues that Christ has two forms that co-operate, for St. Sophronius of Jerusalem, this means that Christ has two energies because He has two natures.^[xxxv] St. Sophronius is not the only one who thinks that St. Leo’s tome implies the doctrine of two energies in Christ, one of Severus’ main misgiving against the tome is its language of two energies:

When the one Christ has once been divided (and he is divided by the fact that they speak of two natures after the union), with the natures which have been cut asunder into a duality and separated into a distinct diversity go the operations and properties which are the offspring of this division, as the words of Leo’s impious letter state in what he said: “For each of the forms effects in partnership with the other that which belongs to itself, the Word doing that which belongs to the Word, and the body performing the things which belong to the body”.^[xxxvi]

This is significant as it directly relates to the Monothelite controversy and why the Byzantines imperial members thought declaring that Christ was one will would somehow lead to a union between the two churches, it was one of the main fundamental differences between the two parties from the start! According to Grillmeier, the rejection of two energies in Christ starts from Dioscorus.^[xxxvii] Severus himself has many letters where he speaks against two wills and energies,

We have understood and understand the statement of all-holy Dionysius the Areopagite, which says: ‘But when God became human He performed for us a new divine-human (theandric) activity’, as (meaning) one composite (activity); in our eyes it cannot be understood other than as a rejection of every duality; and we confess that when God became human He performed this (activity) in a new way, both as one divine-human (theandric) nature and hypostasis, just as one incarnate nature of God the Word.”^[xxxviii]

Some more ecumenically minded Anti-Chalcedonians recently try to argue that Severus in reality is a dyothelite and dyoenergist, the main quote they bring up to defend this claim is from his Against the Grammarian:

“He is indeed one from two, from divinity and humanity, one person and hypostasis, one nature of the Word, become flesh and perfect human being. For this reason He also displays two wills in salvific suffering, the one which requests, the other which is prepared, the one human, and the other divine.”^[xxxix]

However, once the full text is read within the context, we can see that this is a rejection of two wills, not an affirmation of it:

“The teacher of divine dogmas [Athanasius] has characterised very well the request (of Christ) to avert suffering as ‘will’; in this way he shows that it occurs for us against the inclination and will to have fear and trembling in the face of danger, but Christ took this over voluntarily. Thus there was really a will (as intention) present, no involuntary suffering. He [Athanasius] immediately showed that he acknowledges the one Christ from two and does not divide up into two wills what belongs to one and the same, namely the incarnate God, by adding this after the passage cited: ’He suffers from weakness, but He lives from the power of God’ (2 Corinthians 13.4). The power of God is, however, the Son Who suffered from weakness, that is from union with the flesh, as a human being He prayed to be freed from suffering; He lives, however, through His power.”^[xl]

Christ merely “shows” that He has two wills, rather than Him legitimately having those two wills. To understand the mechanics of Christ’s wills, we need to understand the relationship between the human nature and divine nature in Christ according to Severus: “In the same way hypostasis does not deny genus or ousia, or abolish it, but it sets apart and limits in particular icons the one who subsists.”^[xli]

That which is subsisting and that which is self-subsistent have an iconic relationship, this is where the nuanced aspect of hypostases according to Anti-Chalcedonianism comes into play and where we will truly be introduced to a completely alien metaphysic to the common understanding of Orthodox metaphysics today.

Hypostases are either self-subsistent or non-self-subsistent. And they are either simple or they are composite. For example, human hypostasis is composite and self-subsistent, which is formed of a non-self-subsistent hypostasis which is the body, and non-self-subsistent hypostasis which is the soul, their composition forms a self-subsistent composite human hypostasis. In the case of Christ, the situation is a tad bit different for although He before the incarnation was a simple divine hypostasis, He united to Himself with a non-self-subsistent composite human hypostasis. If we were to compare Severus’ hypostatic union to Nestorius’ prosopic union, they would ultimately differ on the subsisting status of the human hypostasis. Nestorius who believes in the prosopic union says Christ’s human hypostasis is self-subsistent, Severus says it isn’t. This also means that for Severus hypostasis and prosopon can be synonyms but not always, Prosopon then means a self-subsistent hypostasis.^[xlii] In a prosopic union, there would still be two countable things to refer to, whereas in a hypostatic union there is only one.

“It is a characteristic of self-subsistent hypostases (but not non-self-subsistent hypostases) that they are subject to numeration.”^[xliii] Therefore the non-self-subsistent hypostasis is not counted as an entity, but more than that its faculties are not counted either. This is why we do not speak of the body running and the soul thinking, but the person doing these things. In the case of Christ, this means that we can only speak of the Incarnate Word, that is God, that is doing things. It is unacceptable to speak of the human nature as even a grammatical subject.^[xliv] This is what allows there to be an iconic relationship between the self-subsistent hypostasis and non-self-subsistent hypostasis in Christ.^[xlv]

The humanity of Christ then is considered to be an image of the divinity in Christ, the two opposing principles are thus united by the Divinity taking control of the humanity just like how the body and the soul, being two opposed principles by nature come to unite with the soul overtaking it if the person is a moral person rather than a worldly sinful person, so does the spiritual nature in Christ dominate the earthly nature.^[xlvi] Philoxenus of Mabbug says concerning the body and the soul “and as their natures are contrary to each other, even so also are their wills”.^[xlvii]

Chesnut points out that the humanity of Christ being non-self-subsistent is the reason why the faculties of human nature are also considered non-self-subsistent, and thus they are not numbered either. The most we can say concerning His humanity is when we speak of Christ in the composite. Yet Christ isn’t devoid of a human will, rather it is moved by the divine will. His human will isn’t moved by His humanity, rather it is moved by His divinity, and thus it is the divine nature that moves the human nature. This is an iconic relationship in which the human nature represents the divine nature according to its properties. Therefore, the human will although is an icon, is not a mirror image, since it does not have the properties to be a divine will.^[xlviii]

Finally, Christ has one will and one energy because there is only one hypostasis in Christ and the hypostasis is the source of operative motion.^[xlix] Severus in his correspondence with Sergius the Grammarian says:

“Therefore when we anathematize those who say Emmanuel has two natures after the union, and (speak of the) activities and properties of these, we are not saying this as subjecting to anathema the fact of speaking of, or naming, natures, or activities or properties, but speaking of two natures after the union, and because consequently (those natures) attract their own activities and properties which are divided along with the natures completely and in everything.” [l]

The statement “attract their own activities and properties” is sufficient proof that according to Severus, energy, property, etc. are proper to hypostasis, which is the nature/essence.

Severus’ Christology is starting to become clearer and we are starting to realize where he is coming from, a summary can tell us that Severus’ Christology is fundamentally dependent on Chalcedon being wrong, he sees Chalcedon as repeating Nestorius’ errors which are constituted of speaking of Christ as two after the union when St. Cyril spoke of one, especially after 433, and that it cannot properly create a functional Christology due to its inability to admit Christ as one particular thing, either having to admit two particulars in Christ, which is Nestorian, or two universals in Christ which is illogical. Severus also understands that Christ is a divine person who assumes an impersonal human nature, and due to it being impersonal, it moves according to the operation of the divine nature, and so Christ can still experience genuine human events whilst remaining as God. If He was two natures, then there would be an independent human will and energy of Christ, rendering the incarnation as not a hypostatic union, but rather a union of two subjects who at most can achieve an external union by acting the same way, as human beings can sometimes do. The human nature of Christ is also an icon of the divine nature since it is united to His divine nature, which makes all of the human faculties of Christ’s the property of the divine nature, even though it does not lose any of its characteristics. We can very evidently see a strong emphasis on the unity of Christ here, and mostly shunning any idea of duality, the duality of Christ only exists according to the mind, not in reality, thus Christ is one nature or hypostasis, and has one property and one energy.

Severus of Antioch is the most important dogmatic theologian for the Anti-Chalcedonian Church as an erudite scholar, but he is not without his errors. We will now critique Severus’ theology in more detail, and how it is fundamentally heretical.

On Severus of Antioch’s Errors

To successfully do this, it would help us first to categorize the angles of attack we are going to undertake. I believe that Anti-Chalcedonian theology on a lot of fronts is very deficient, I will however mostly avoid the historical debates that require a lot of nuances which in my opinion is overestimated in its necesssity since a lot of people have been doing that over the centuries, failing to get to the heart of the issue. If you are expecting me to excessively quote mine St. Cyril of Alexandria, this is not the article to do that and St. Cyril’s Christology is something that deserves multiple books and commentaries on alone. We will also not deal with the canonical arguments of Chalcedon and Ephesus II, what we are interested in is a critical analysis of Severus’ Christology.

History of “Miaphysis” and Theological Formulations

The strongest argument Anti-Chalcedonian had in the 5th-6th centuries was that the cornerstone of their Christology, that is the popular formula associated with St. Cyril “One nature of God the Word enfleshed” was a patristic formula found not only in St. Cyril but also fathers like St. Athanasius. St. Cyril of Alexandria regularly quoted these “miaphysite” statements he thought were from these Church Fathers when in reality they were forgeries of Apollinarius^[li]. It is also important to note that the patristic norm was to state that Christ was two natures after the union, as testified by both eastern and western Saints.^[lii]

St. Cyril’s accidental proclamation of an Apollinarian formula was the motivation for his opponents to accuse him of being an Apollinarian, although due to his regular insistence that Christ has a rational soul, this complaint eventually subsided.^[liii] Fr. Florovsky points out how Leontius of Byzantium was amongst the scholars who found out about the true nature of the “miaphysite” statements from the fathers before St. Cyril, they were all from Apollinaris.^[liv] Furthermore, Leontius of Jerusalem cites a certain Timothy, who was a disciple of Apollinaris in his “Against the Monophysites”. Timothy’s understanding of the debate between Apollinaris and the Orthodox is most definitely illuminating:

“A certain Timothy, a disciple of Apollinarius, affirms in his Church History that these things were said by Apollinarius in the sense intended by you, and so does his companion Polemon, whom both the father Cyril and the patricidal Severus mention. Here’s what he says: ‘Those who say that the same [Christ] is both God and man aren’t ashamed of confessing one incarnate nature of God the Word as being some sort of compound [Christ]. That is to say, if the same [Christ] is complete God and complete man, then He is two natures—just what the Cappadocians’ innovation introduces, as do the opinion of Diodore and Athanasius and the vanity of the Italians. They pretend that they really belong to our party, and that they hold the opinions of our holy father Apollinarius, but they proclaim just what the Gregories proclaim: the duality of natures.’ And after a bit: ‘Why do they pretend they want to become disciples of the divine Apollinarius? All by himself he produced for us this [formula] with the aim of destroying the duality of natures, having somehow openly written as follows: “[We confess] that He is both Son of God and God in spirit, but Son of Man in flesh. We do not confess that the one Son is two natures, one that is to be worshipped, and another that is not to be worshipped, but one incarnate nature of God the Word, worshipped along with His flesh in one act of worship.”^[lv]

We can see here that Apollinaris was a staunch supporter of the one nature argument, for him Christ cannot be two substances, otherwise, He’d be two persons^[lvi], which is why Christ is one nature. The presupposition that two complete natures lead to two persons is present not only in Nestorians but also amongst Monophysites as well who speak of, as Zachuber calls it, there being no nature without hypostasis.^[lvii] The Orthodox on the other hand would follow the Enhypostasis doctrine, which in short means that the human nature of Christ exists in the divine hypostasis, rather than having a hypostasis of its own.

Severans, deny the idea that in Christ there was a lack of a rational soul. Although they believe in the NNWH-principle^[lviii] like the Apollinarians, they do not see the soul as self-subsistent as Apollinarius does. Severans believe both the soul and the body to be non-self-subsistent, only their combination brings out something self-subsistent, Apollinarius however considered the person to either be the soul, or to be in the soul, and thus he viewed it as self-subsistent. It does raise the question, what of the status of the soul after death?

“If we assume that Peter’s soul could exist by itself at any stage without his body, then Peter’s soul is a self-subsistent hypostasis, for a self-subsistent hypostasis is one that exists in its own right.”^[lix]

Knowing that death is the separation of the soul from the body and that the person goes into the afterlife via the soul, does this not mean that the soul becomes self-subsistent? It seems that once we accept this metaphysical dichotomy of self-subsistence vs. non-self-subsistence we run into a problem in which the Apollinarian scheme is at least more consistent than the Severan one unless the Anti-Chalcedonian can figure out how a non-self-subsistent hypostasis can become self-subsistent.

What about St. Cyril’s usage of one nature? Does this not at least mean something? St. Cyril uses the “mia physis” formula only three times before the formula of reunion^[lx] and two of those times were him quoting Pseudo-Athanasius^[lxi] on something that wasn’t even relevant to the discussion on whether Christ was one nature or not.^[lxii] The one time he uses mia physis in an actual argument is on Contra Nestorium in which he likens the hypostatic union to the body-soul union, hardly an argument that is exclusive to miaphysitism. Having made this point, it would only be fair to point out that St. Cyril does start to regularly use one nature expressions, even though it was done after he said two nature expressions from the Antiochians were acceptable.^[lxiii] As stated at the beginning, I do not intend to analyze the entire Cyrilline corpus for it would need a book on its own, and the Anti-Chalcedonian reader might be tempted to unleash his sea of St. Cyril’s miaphysite expressions,^[lxiv] but before they do that we must first establish that the Orthodox do not have a problem with St. Cyril’s one nature statements. According to the 5th Ecumenical Council, we can accept the miaphysite formula if understood in these senses:

1. That the term “nature” means hypostasis,^[lxv] that is there is one incarnate hypostasis of God the Word enfleshed
2. The one nature is the hypostatic union of the two natures
3. That the one nature out of two is not confused nor mixed, thus it can still retain their distinct characteristics and also be spoken to be “two natures” in a more proper sense, that is that they are conceptually distinguished.

The first point is the standard Anti-Chalcedonian interpretation, for they understood hypostasis to mean a particular, and that Christ is one particular out of two realities (human nature and divine nature). This insight is fundamentally Cyrillian, but is the one particular the hypostasis that is out of two universal natures that are particularized in the hypostasis^[lxvi] (which is the Orthodox interpretation of “union according to hypostasis”), or is it simply a hypostasis that’s a composition of two particulars, in the case of the Severans, two hypostases? [lxvii]

Severus’ Christological Deficiencies

At this stage, it should be evident that the Anti-Chalcedonian understanding of the hypostatic union is completely different compared to the Orthodox understanding. For the Anti-Chalcedonian, the hypostatic union is a union of two hypostases, for the Orthodox, it is a union in the hypostasis, more accurately, it is a union of two universal natures in the person of Christ. This for us is the implication of the “double homoousion”, Christ is consubstantial with humanity and divinity, this means that He has the substance of humanity and divinity simultaneously, resulting in the reality that He has two ousiai, that is two universal natures.

Severus in turn considers the natures Christ is out of to be particulars. To say that Christ is two natures is to say Christ is two particulars, that is, two hypostases. The first problem with Severus’ view is that the term “hypostatic union” or “union according to hypostasis” implies the union happens in the hypostasis and not of hypostases. Similarly, when we say the Trinity is united in essence, the union is not of essences, but rather it is essential, that is, united in the identity of essence. Severus interprets the Fathers completely differently from how they are supposed to be read on these points. For instance, when St. Gregory the Theologian in his letter to Cledonius says there was a union of two essences in Christ, Severus interprets the term essence to mean hypostasis:

But neither do we deny, as we have also written in other letters on different occasions, that we often find men designating hypostases by the name of essence. Hence Gregory the Theologian named hypostatic union in essence in the letter to Cledonius which we have just mentioned, speaking thus: ‘Whoever says that he worked by grace as in a prophet, but not that he was united and fashioned together with him in essence, may he be bereft of the excellent operation, or rather may he be full of the contrary’.^[lxviii]

Next argument would be what I like to call the “Distinction is plurality”^[lxix] principle. St. Cyril is adamant on affirming a distinction between the two natures Christ is out of, even after the union^[lxx], Severus is not in disagreement on this point either. If divine nature and human nature in Christ are still distinct after the union, then it seems fairly straightforward to say they are still two natures. The argument is devastating in its simplicity, to state that Christ is one out of two natures without also affirming He is in two natures would essentially be to deny that they are distinct after the union, hence why the fathers of Chalcedon rejected Dioscorus’ defense of saying that he affirms out of two natures, but not two natures,^[lxxi] as a result, the definition included the statement that Christ was in two natures, this definition was written by miaphysites such as Basil of Seleucia^[lxxii] who argued both formulae were acceptable provided that one qualifies them properly.^[lxxiii]

This argument of distinction implying plurality of natures is specifically made by Leontius of Jerusalem:

Furthermore, difference is difference between certain things. The definition of difference, after all, belongs to things involved in some difference, and not to things understood in and of themselves. Since you’re people who speak of a difference, then, you’d grant that there also are things that differ in Christ. As for how many of these there are, you’d have to say there are at least two. If you were driven to say what these differing things are, you would, as I see it, identify divinity and humanity. If you were cross-examined about which of the classes of beings you recognize these as belonging to, and if they’re not qualities, or quantities, or states, or something of that kind, you’d have to confess that they are, without question, substances. It follows that you do speak of two substances because of the difference in Christ.^[lxxiv]

Severus does not dedicate much time to answering this problem. In an exchange with Sergius the Grammarian, he says he does not deny speaking of natures, wills, and energies, but referring to them as two.^[lxxv] As we’ve stated prior, Severus sees duality as division, but to say that we can speak of plural nouns and not refer to plural numbers is a very confused answer, and in essence, it doesn’t seem to differ from his interpretation of dual language in Christ in the pre-Chalcedonian fathers, in which he chalks it up to meaning being of two natures, rather than in two natures. John Philoponus on the other hand dedicates time to answering this objection, as he does with many Chalcedonian objections in his “Arbiter”^[lxxvi]. For John, you do not need to speak of Christ being plural natures just because you admit there to be a distinction, because the unity of the two natures precedes their distinction: “Hence if they are minded to speak of two natures of Christ because of their not being confused, none the less they will be obliged to speak of His one nature because of the union.” [lxxvii]

For John, union means “to be made one”, if Christ’s two natures are united, they definitionally have to be one nature if they are genuinely united. To say that the two natures are united and are still two after the union is to say that there’s a union and then separation, or that there’s simultaneously a union and separation. Philoponus’ objection hinges on a dialectical opposition between unity and plurality, which is also why his Trinitarian theology is Tritheist. Not only do the Orthodox accept the miaphysite formula provided it is given accurate qualifications, it also understands that the union in a sense is the hypostasis since it occurs in it, not only that, since plurality and unity are not in dialectical opposition, a reality can be both united and plural at the same time provided that it is united in a certain sense, and plural in another sense.

Another Christological problem for Severus would be, which in many ways is similar to the previous one, is whether the hypostasis of Christ is created or uncreated. St. Maximus the Confessor uses this argument^[lxxviii] against the Monothelites by asking them whether they understand Christ’s will to be created or uncreated. A century before St. Maximus, Leontius of Jerusalem makes the following argument:

“Everything that exists is either created or uncreated, for ‘even those who invent goat-stags aren’t going to grant that there’s a mean between them’^[lxxix], as the father says. If, then, there’s one nature of Christ, and if it really is uncreated, what’s the nature from the Holy Virgin? If, on the other hand, Christ’s one nature is created, what’s the nature that’s consubstantial with the uncreated Father? Likewise, if this one nature is ungenerated, and if it’s independent of time, what’s the nature that’s born of a virgin, and what’s this entity which, when the fullness of time arrived, existed in later times? If there was a temporal hour of birth, too, what nature is it through which all things came to be, and through which the Father made the ages? How is Christ, who has no beginning for His life nor end of His days, said in the same text to be made like Melchizedek? What’s one and the same in relation to something won’t admit the predicates of its opposites in the same respect, as is often said.”^[lxxx]

Leontius understands that even amongst those who believe in mixtures and fusions, reality is divided into created and uncreated, and so one thing by itself cannot simultaneously be created and uncreated, if it is then we would need to distinguish parts of it that are created and other parts as uncreated. This is precisely the argument he is trying to make with Monophysitism: If Christ is a created particular, then He is a human hypostasis, if Christ is an uncreated particular, then He is a divine hypostasis. Severan Miaphysitism, however, insists that He is a composite hypostasis, which means there is part of this hypostasis that is uncreated, and another part of it that is indeed created, meaning that in reality there is not one, but two hypostases or natures! Not only does this apply to hypostasis but as St. Maximus points out, it can point out to His faculties too, therefore Christ is not only two natures, but also two wills, energies, and properties.

For the Orthodox, we would repeat the sentiments of St. Maximus who states that His humanity is attributed to Him as a nature, while His divinity is attributed to Him as hypostasis.^[lxxxi] This means that Christ is created according to His human nature, but uncreated according to His divine hypostasis, by allowing for a distinction between hypostasis and nature, the Orthodox can answer this question whereas the monophysite is unable to. We should also mention that for St. Maximus, although Christ is simple in His hypostasis, He is also materially composite:^[lxxxii]

It is by the mode of the Economy and not according to the law of nature that the Word of God has come to men in the flesh. Thus therefore Christ is not a composite nature, contrary to the theory of those who void the Gospel, because He exists according to the hypostatic mode totally independent of the law of composite nature. But He is a composite hypostasis which does not comprise synthetic nature which would be attributed to Him according to essence. This is truly paradoxical: to contemplate a composite hypostasis without the composite nature being attributed to Him according to essence^[lxxxiii].

We understand then that Christ is a composite hypostasis in the sense that the composition is not of hypostases, but of natures in the hypostasis which as he describes is paradoxical, but is not logically contradictory.

This topic of whether Christ properly created or uncreated becomes much clearer when we observe the dispute between Severus of Antioch and Julian of Halicarnassus^[lxxxiv], Julian argues that there is no real difference, which he refers to as a “non-different difference” between His humanity and His divinity^[lxxxv]. Julian accuses Severus of being a crypto-dyophysite for believing that Christ has two properties, [lxxxvi] Severus pushes back by denying that he believes in two properties, but rather that he affirms human and divine natural qualities^[lxxxvii]. Natural qualities would resemble something like human accidents, for example, eye color whereas property refers to things like immutability, impassibility, and so on. For Severus, natural qualities by what they themselves are are numerous and separable whereas properties, like Julian thought, are proper to nature. Here we can observe the insight Julian tried to get at: To say that Christ has human properties alongside the divine, is to say that He is two natures. Severus responds that it does not allow for a two-nature interpretation because the nature of Christ is composite and that He is out of two. Not only did the Orthodox see the problem with Severus’ explanation, but even his fellow monophysites (although they were eventually condemned by the Anti-Chalcedonian Church) also noticed that Severus wanted to make use of the positive aspects of a “dual nature” Christology without fully admitting to it.

The Orthodox argue for a dyophysite Christology mainly due to the double homoousion in Christ, since He is fully consubstantial with man and fully consubstantial with God. The Anti-Chalcedonians believed in the double homoousion as well, but how could they justify such a belief in the first place? Remember that for Severus, ousia is a collection of hypostases, and therefore to speak of two ousia or one ousia in a subject is to say that the entirety of that ousia was in that subject, this is why Severus speaks neither of two ousiai in Christ^[lxxxviii], nor one ousia^[lxxxix]. John Philoponus says the quiet part out loud in his arbiter as he tries to respond to an argument made by St. Justinian where he says that Christ being double homoousion would mean that He has two ousiai or natures.^[xc] John responds to this by saying that this argument doesn’t have much of strength since he professes a composite nature. He uses the analogy of the body and soul where human nature is one but is still consubstantial with body and consubstantial with the soul, thus human nature has double consubstantiality and yet is only one substance^[xci].

John’s argument has several problems, one of them is the lack of an expansion on the term substance or nature. Consubstantiality refers to two or more subjects having the same substance, it does not refer to the parts of that substance. To say that human nature is consubstantial with the body or that it is consubstantial with the soul is to effectively say three things: That the body is consubstantial with the soul, that human nature=body and human nature=soul when in reality it is human nature=body+soul, and to treat body and soul as subjects that are part of a “human substance” rather than body and soul being substances themselves. John’s view also allows for the idea of speaking of a “Christic nature”, which he does not seem to deny such a possibility!

A Short Mention on Triadology

One would also wonder about the status of the Trinity in Anti-Chalcedonianism. If all a hypostasis is a particular nature, then wouldn’t that mean that the Trinity is three natures since there are three hypostases? To view Hypostasis as merely the concretization of nature would necessitate such a view, Orthodox theology avoids this by distinguishing between hypostasis and nature which fundamentally finds its Christological roots in the 4^th Ecumenical Council. As St. John of Damascus says: “However, the reason for the heretics’ error is their saying that nature and hypostasis are the same thing.”^[xcii]

Severus in multiple places affirms that there’s a division between the hypostases in the Trinity^[xciii], and that their unity is based on essence. John Philoponus took the logical conclusions of the idea that hypostasis is merely a particular nature and decided that then, the Trinity is three particular natures, resulting in the heresy of tritheism which was condemned at the 6^th Ecumenical Council.

Conclusion

What is covered in this writing is the specific theology of Severus of Antioch, and some responses to his Christological scheme and logic, there are still many unanswered questions, such as the Triadology of Severans in more detail, what exactly happened at the Council of Chalcedon and other Severan writers and their theology such as Philoxenus of Mabbug and Timothy the Weasel, and the response of Orthodox theology against the heresies of Severans from figures such as Leontius of Jerusalem, St. Justinian, St. Maximus the Confessor and St. John of Damascus. These questions will eventually be answered in a much longer work, perhaps even a book, soon.