In this paper I examine the very nature of epistemic theories and whether any theory can overcome the problem of its own justification. I will attempt to show that metatheoretical validation requires justifying the fundamental premises of an epistemic theory. These fundamental premises either cannot be justified because they are merely assumed without any supplementary warrant or they are justified because of other premises, which inevitably leads back to their justification either being the theory itself (epistemic circularity) or it gives rise to an endless chain of reasons in which the justification for each premise presupposes the justification of the previous premise and this of still another and so on ad infinitum. I conclude that although there may be conditions that serve to be “justifications” that give rise to real instances of knowledge at the 1st-order, the insurmountable difficulties with metatheoretical validation leaves us incapable of producing an epistemic theory that would allow us to assess those theories validity without already presupposing an unjustified answer to the original question about the nature of knowledge. In other words, it may be possible to have 1st-order knowledge, but we won’t be able to say whether we have knowledge or not (2nd-order knowledge) without already begging the question about what knowledge is. I then offer a solution to this seemingly impossible problem and skeptical challenge.
The question about whether knowledge exists and what the justifications would be for the existence of knowledge is not new. These questions were raised in antiquity with Sextus Empiricus, Epicurus, and the Stoics. These concerns are also seen with Montaingne, Descartes, and Kant before moving into contemporary epistemology and their responses. I have written several articles addressing the epistemological issues and problems that arise in an attempt to affirm that knowledge exists or provide justification for one’s epistemic theories when solely isolated within one’s own sphere of reason.[1] Following Luciano Florididi, I would like to point out that these skeptical critiques are not meant to undermine that validity of knowledge or suggest that knowledge at the 1st-order does not exist, but rather to point out the various meta-epistemological problems with the various theories and their ability as theories to establish the existence of knowledge.[2]
In this paper, I will focus on several skeptical challenges to epistemic theories that make their metatheoretical validation problematic. These will include Agrippa’s Trilemma, the Problem of Criterion, and other similar arguments that I myself have developed.
The problem of justification and our ability to justify that knowledge exists can be seen it what is known as Agrippa’s Trilemma, named after the ancient Greek philosopher Agrippa, one of the Pyrrhonian skeptics. It presents three possible positions – all assumedly untenable – concerning what could justify our beliefs so as to make them qualify as knowledge:
- Our beliefs are unsupported; therefore, we do not have knowledge.
- Our beliefs are supported by an infinite chain of beliefs/justifications; therefore, we do not have knowledge.
- Our beliefs are supported by a circular chain of beliefs/justifications; therefore, we do not have knowledge.[3]
There have traditionally been three different theories proposed concerning how knowledge might be structured so as to avoid this trilemma. They are infinitism, coherentism, and foundationalism. As Duncan Pritchard points out, infinitism (the belief that an infinite chain of beliefs can be justification for another belief) is the least plausible, and does not require further consideration in this paper.[4] Instead, we will focus on coherentism and foundationalism. Relevant to our overall consideration, we will see that these theories cannot overcome the problem of their own justification, which relates to the overall thesis of this paper that metatheoretical validation requires either their justification being the theory itself (epistemic circularity) or it gives rise to an endless chain of reasons in which the justification for each premise presupposes the justification of the previous premise and this of still another and so on ad infinitum.
Foundationalism is one epistemic theory offered as a solution to the infinite regress problem, one that avoids the circularity, a charge leveled against its opposing theory, coherentism. However, as Daniele Sgaravatti points out,
One problem concerning foundationalist views, surprisingly, has to do with circularity, which is supposed to be the problem mostly affecting coherentist views. On the other hand, coherentist views seem to be open to the charge of dogmatic adherence to an initial set of belief, a problem more easily associated with foundationalism.[5]
Next, we will look at what is called the Problem of Criterion. There are several issues historically that are intertwined in the Problem of Criterion: 1) is knowledge possible (an epistemological question) and 2) what is the criterion whereby knowledge is both attainable and justified (a metatheoretic question)? We see the problem of criterion take on different forms and developments in history, which Luciano Florididi states takes two paths: “that which goes from Sextus Empiricus through Montaigne up to Roderick Chisholm and that which goes from Sextus Empiricus through Descartes and Gassendi to contemporary discussions of the Cartesian circle and Chisholm again.”[6] For the purpose of this paper, we will focus on Chisholm’s Problem of the Criterion, since he focuses explicitly on the metatheoretical nature of the problem, which is the primary consideration of this paper (as opposed to the epistemological problem of whether knowledge exists at all). Roderick Chisholm in his paper, “The Problem of Criterion,”[7] presents his meta-epistemological problem as follows:
- What are we justified in believing?
- What makes our beliefs justified? (What are the criteria of justification?)
According to Chisholm, the problem is that we don’t seem to be able to answer the first question unless we already have an answer to the second question, and we don’t seem to be able to answer the second question unless we already have an answer to the first question. To identify our justified beliefs, we need the criteria of justification. And to specify the criteria of justification, we need to be able to identify particular instances of justified belief. We are caught in a circle. We cannot answer question 1 until we have answered question 2. And we cannot answer question 2 until we have answered question 1. Therefore we cannot answer either question. Hence, we are led to a meta- epistemological problem.
- I can identify instances of knowledge provided I already know what the criteria for knowledge are.
- I can only know what the criteria for knowledge are provided I am already able to identify instances of knowledge.
I must either assume that I can independently know what the criteria for knowledge are in order to indentify instances of knowledge, or else I must assume that I can I identify instance of knowledge in order to determine what the criteria for knowledge are. In other words, which comes first: a) knowing the criteria of knowledge or b) knowing that knowledge exists and x is an instance of knowledge? If a) comes first, then you know what knowledge is such that knowing the criteria for knowledge is an instance of knowledge and therefore you have knowledge of a criterion prior to having knowledge of this criterion. If b) comes first, then you can know something is knowledge prior to you knowing there is knowledge, since identifying something as knowledge requires knowing the criterion in order to identify something as an instance of knowledge.
Inspired by Chisholm’s Problem of Criterion, I have written about the relationship between metatheories and epistemology and the various epistemic difficulties that arise in attempting confirm or validate the “correct” metaphysics (metatheoretical validation), and in turn prove or validate the “correct” epistemological theory.[8] This further led me to develop arguments concerning the dialectical tensions between 1st and 2nd-order knowledge that makes it impossible to affirm the existence of 1st-order knowledge without putting 2nd-order knowledge epistemically prior to the 1st-order knowledge, which amounts to either circular reasoning or an appeal to an infinite series of justifications to justify by 2nd-order claim. My argument can be summarized as follows: let (1) stand for “knowledge exists” and (2) stand for the statement “‘knowledge exists’.” I cannot get to (1) without (2) but (2) is dependent upon (1); therefore, I never confirm (1).[9] Obviously epistemic theories that demand only “reasons” or “beliefs” can be justifications for other beliefs or rely on inferences as the sole means for justification will be most vulnerable to this critique; however, as we will see, even theories like externalism will have problems (perhaps for different reasons) with overcoming this argument. Nevertheless, because externalism seems to be the best way around this objection, let us turn to consider this epistemic theory and see how externalism might answer some of the challenges regarding these meta-epistemic problems.
Whether an epistemic theory is seen, either fully or in part, as a justification for knowledge (e.g., internalism) or whether the epistemic theory is only offered as an explanation (e.g., externalism), it will certainly depend on whether the theory is correct about what constitutes as knowledge, how we identify something as knowledge, and how we provide justification for our metatheoretical validation of our epistemic theory itself. This relates to the Problem of Criterion and how one can have a criterion for one’s justification criterion to identify what constitutes as knowledge, which depends on the metatheoretical validation of one’s epistemic theory.
One of the solutions to Chisholm’s Problem of the Criterion is to suggest we start with an instance of knowledge and then decide our method for determining knowledge. This is known as particularism. However, the problem with this is that it purports to be able to identify something as a particular instance of knowledge, which is exactly what is in question. Of course it may be admitted (at least theoretically speaking) that it might be possible for someone to know prior to the person being able to determine how or whether we know (e.g. externalism); nevertheless, this is not the issue at hand in Chisholm’s problem of criterion. The objection to particularism as a solution is that to “identify” or “start” with an instance of knowledge presupposes that you can correctly identify a particular belief as an instance of knowledge; and if you cannot know that it is an instance of knowledge, then starting with a belief that is assumed to be knowledge is not justified in any way. If it turns out that the belief one takes to be knowledge is in fact not knowledge, then clearly one is wrong and particularism has solved nothing; however, if the belief one chooses to be an instance of knowledge turns out to actually be a genuine case of knowledge, then one’s “getting it right” is simply accidental and not justified, nor would it tell you that what you accidently got correct was in fact an instance of knowledge.[10]
The externalist claims that knowing is a matter of external conditions that do not depend on one’s awareness of them nor one’s access to the “reasons” why something is knowledge. Therefore, the externalist believes they have a way out of Chisholm’s problem of the criterion through something like particularism. There are a couple of ways to respond to this. First, the claim that “knowing is a matter of external conditions that do not depend on one’s awareness of them nor one’s access to the reasons why something is knowledge” is a knowledge claim. How does one “know” this? The usual response is to argue that if the theory is correct, then this is how one knows these claims to be true. Externalists often attempt to get out of the immediately apparent epistemic-bootstrapping problem by repeating the point that 2nd-order knowledge and metatheoretical claims don’t need to be justified by their epistemic theory, since knowledge doesn’t require access or awareness of one’s own theory, but only that what the theory is saying is true and 1st-order knowledge be the way the externalist says it is. However, what is the connection between the epistemic theory and the content of which the theory is talking about? The externalist will want to say that knowledge is causal, but it is hard to see how nonlogical, nondoxastic causes can cause an epistemic theory in any justified way. Therefore, at best the externalist’s epistemic theory is coincidental to the truth of what it is describing, but it is neither caused by such state of affairs nor is it logically connected to those nonlogical, nondoxastic external causes and states of affairs. Second, and related to the aforementioned problem, the externalist will say that any 1st-order knowledge will be constitutive (a necessary condition) of any 2nd-order knowledge, which is generally speaking true, such that if one’s belief at the 1st-order is formed/caused in the right way regardless of being aware of how or why, then this condition can in principle provide a justification for one’s 2nd-order belief since the content is the same for both; however, this is to return to the original problem outlined with particularism. The question is about how we identify something as being an instance of 1st-order knowledge. One could say that as long as someone forms a 2nd-order true belief about one’s epistemic theory in a reliable manner, as the externalist describes, then this is all that is required to justify one’s epistemic theory and provide metatheoretic validation.[11] Because on the externalist view access to “reasons,” although allowed, is never required to justify any belief, it pushes the problem out another meta-level. How do we identify that the higher-order metatheoretical claims about one’s theory qualify as instances of knowledge without specifically relying on “reasons”? How would we justify these reasons without providing any supplementary warrant (i.e., merely assuming them)? If they aren’t arbitrarily assumed, how would we justify them without asserting they are justified because of other premises that inevitably lead back to their justification being the theory itself (epistemic circularity)? The only other option is that one’s metatheoretical claims about one’s theory rely on an endless chain of reasons, the justification for each premise presupposing the justification of the previous premise so on ad infinitum. Obviously none of these are acceptable. Furthermore, due to reliabilism’s problem of generality, such a theory will fail to provide us a way to see “which various descriptions of the cognitive processes in question is the relevant one for applying the reliabilist’s principle of justification” and “which of these widely varying characterizations of the process and corresponding degrees of reliability is the right one… for assessing the justification”[12] of a particular belief.[13] This issue not only applies to particular beliefs but also to the theory’s ability to provide the level of specificity required to justify the metatheoretical claims about the theory itself.
Related to the problem of its own metatheoretic verification and justification, externalism fails to provide either a necessary or sufficient condition for knowledge.[14] Furthermore, we can see through a simple modus tollens argument how externalism is false and cannot provide a way around the epistemic issues surrounding metatheoretic verification and justifying one’s own epistemic theory. Consider the following argument[15]:
- If externalism (reliablism) is true, then external causes reliably forming true beliefs is a sufficient condition for knowledge.
- External causes (nonconceptual/nonlogical causes) reliably forming true beliefs is not a sufficient condition for knowledge.
- Therefore, externalism is false.[16]
Of course if an epistemic theory is false, it cannot be offered as an explanation of how knowledge is possible, even if such a theory purports to not require an awareness criterion/principle (e.g., internalism) where it is necessary to have access to other beliefs or be aware of the theory that explains how knowledge and justification is possible. There is much available work arguing how mere reliability is neither necessary nor sufficient condition of justification. The obvious cases that demonstrate this are examples where other beliefs and an awareness or access to those beliefs are required for justification (e.g., mathematics, demonstrations, et. al.) Concerning the sufficient condition, we see the famous objections concerning clairvoyance, animal and child cognition (unsophisticated epistemic subjects), et. al. These objections show that one can fulfill all the conditions of reliabilism and yet not count as instances of knowledge. However, as I pointed out at the beginning of this paper, we will not be concerned with epistemological problems of whether knowledge exists, but rather the meta-epistemological problems a theory itself has establishing that knowledge exists, justifying its criteria, and providing metatheoretic validation that doesn’t result in circular reasoning or an infinite regress of justifications. Here I will focus on epistemic theories reliance on inference in their attempt to provide a metatheoretical validation of their own theory concerning knowledge, justification, and their criteria for justification. Therefore, we can avoid the whole conversation about whether one can have immediate noninferential knowledge of a foundationalist externalist variety that would allow a theorist to explain how one could be justified in making 2nd-order claims that knowledge exists (1st-order) which doesn’t depend on an awareness principle nor the theory itself as a justification.
Now since inferential relations are always between items with propositional form, we can inquire into how inferences between different propositions are justified and how we can confirm this. Although this argument is not the same as the Lewis Carroll argument, it was inspired from his own argument that he presents in short story in his “What the Tortoise said to Achilles.”[17] The argument can be formalized and summarized as follows: A valid deductive argument is one in which the premises (p) necessarily imply the truth of the conclusion (q).Therefore, in order to ascent to the conclusion of a valid argument (p, p implies q), one must ascent to a premise that states the premises imply the conclusion (e.g., p and p implies q implies q). Adding a premise merely creates a longer conditional that we must assent to. This will continue ad infinitum. Therefore, in order to assent to the conclusion of a single argument, one must assent to an infinite number of propositions. Hence, we cannot assent to the conclusion of any argument. Related to our present consideration concerning the possibility of metatheoretical validation, which necessarily relies on inference, we can present the skeptical argument as: 1. If it is true that knowledge exists, then the proposition, “knowledge exists” is true. [p implies q][18] 2. If p implies q, then p implies q, implies the proposition, “p implies q” [r]. 3. However, if p implies q, implies the proposition, “p implies q” [r], then [r] implies the proposition, “p implies q, implies the proposition, ‘p implies q’” [s]. 4. But if p implies q, implies [r] and [s], then p implies q also implies the proposition, “if p implies q, then p implies q implies [r] and [s].” [t] 5. Therefore, p implies q implies [r] and [s] and [t], and so on and so on ad infinitum 6. Consequently, to affirm p implies q requires affirming an infinite number of propositions. And since we are finite and cannot affirm an infinite number of propositions, we cannot affirm p implies q. 7. However, every epistemic theory will rely on making an inference from p to q in some way given the nature of theories.[19] 8. Therefore, if an epistemic theory cannot affirm p implies q, then it cannot affirm p (knowledge exists), since this will depend on making an inference that will require affirming an infinite number of propositions, which is impossible.[20] This argument has the advantage of showing the epistemological problems with a theory establishing the existence of knowledge as well as its inability to provide its own metatheoretical validation. Again, every epistemic theory will rely on making inferences as a theory. However, since we are inquiring how one could possibly validate an epistemic theory, this would require a theory to be able to make inferences. But if a theory cannot justify making any inferences because this would require affirming an infinite number of propositions, then there is no way to provide any metatheoretical validation of any epistemic theory. If there is no way to provide any metatheoretical validation of any epistemic theory from an autonomous position, then there is no way that autonomous epistemology can provide a coherent account that knowledge exists or solve the skeptical challenges. Therefore, although one might have knowledge at the 1st-order, and in light of this possibly knowledge at the 2nd-order concerning individual beliefs, there are no “reasons” why we should take one’s metatheory as true, especially if the proposed theory claims that its justifications are non-reasons (e.g., reliablism). What is the solution then to such epistemic difficulties and skeptical challenges? As I have argued elsewhere, these epistemic difficulties and skeptical challenges arise due to the finite nature of man in his limited epistemic position, whereby he attempts to construct a philosophical theory that accounts for knowledge and the world on the assumption that it is possible God does not exist or that it is possible for man to possess knowledge and give a coherent and justified account of this knowledge independent (autonomous) from the existence and revelation of God. This is what I have called autonomous epistemology. In such an attempt, man takes what might be a fragment of the whole and absolutizes it, believing that his speculative philosophical project can be an absolute foundation for a theory of man, knowledge, and the world. However, as St. Justin Popovitch explains, philosophy always presents man as a fragmented being. He states: “Nowhere is he seen as whole, nowhere is he seen as complete and integrated, but always as broken and fragmented. There is no philosophical system in which man is not broken up into parts that would defeat the attempt of any thinker to put them together into a single whole.”[21] He goes on to explain that there are those philosophies that reduced man to the empirical “so that a man is no longer his own master but scattered among things.”[22] In contrast to the various theories of empiricism there is rationalism, which as he states, “separates man and his understanding, seeing the latter as the chief fount of truth and the highest measure of all that is, attributing all worth to it, making it an absolute and idolizing it, while at the same time belittling the other psychic and physical powers of man.”[23] His conclusion is that all the autonomous philosophical systems simply reduce to a superficial, ultimately incoherent and often relativistic account of man and the world where man is left without a central focal point, a true foundation. Where does the world stand? And where does man? What is the foundation of the intellect and of knowledge? Man tries to explain himself in terms of things, but with a total lack of success, for by explaining himself in terms of things, man in the end is reduced to a thing himself, to matter…Still less is he able to show that things possess truth. By attempting to explain man by man, philosophy achieves a bizarre result: it presents a mirror image of a mirror image. In the last analysis, such philosophy, whatever its path, is centered on matter and on man. And one thing follows from all this: the impossibility of any true knowledge of man or of the world. This result compels the philosophical spirit of man to make conjectures that transcend both man and matter. Through idealism he takes a leap into the supernatural. But this leap in turn leads to scepticism, for philosophical idealism regards man as a meta-empirical reality that can neither be described nor proven.[24] What the history of philosophy and epistemology teaches us is that man isolated within his own sphere reason and committed to an autonomous epistemology cannot justify nor validate his meta-epistemic (metatheoretic) account of himself, knowledge or the world. Tragically, man in his pretended autonomy and rebellion against God is incapable of knowing “the nature of himself, logic, the world, universals, or how they all, are, or could be, related. In short he cannot attain a coherent theory of knowledge.”[25] I have argued elsewhere that there are only two options: we either have theonomous epistemology (revelatory theism) or autonomous epistemology. However, if autonomous epistemology is true, then it is possible to make meta-epistemic claims (2nd-order metatheoretical claims) admitting that is possible God does not exist. And if autonomous epistemology is possible, then it is possible that Revelatory Theism (theonomous epistemology is false). However, it is either God (revelatory theism) or not God (not revelatory theism). Since the negation of God (the negation of revelatory theism) is accidentalism (the contrary of purposeful intention), and accidentalism makes knowledge impossible given that there is no “accidental knowledge,” the negation of revelatory theism (theonomous epistemology) must be false. However, if this is false, then its contrary in the exclusive disjunctive must be true. But if revelatory theism is necessarily true, then God must be the necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge and metatheoretical validation. Yet if God (revelatory theism) is the only necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge, then autonomous epistemology implies that it is both possible that the necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge exists and that it is possible that it does not exists, which is a contradiction. Therefore, autonomous epistemology is false; and if autonomous epistemology is false, then its contrary in the exclusive disjunction must be true, i.e., revelatory theism.[26] As St. Justin Popovich goes on to explain: “There is an unbridgeable gulf between man and truth. Man is on one side of this gulf and can find no way of getting to the other, where transcendent Truth is to be found.”[27] Reason, unaided or helped in some way, is incapable of determining whether its processes are legitimate and whether it can know anything at all in from its autonommous meta-epistemic theories. Hence, human reason requires the help of the divine (supernatural assistance by grace) through faith, and it is this faith that allows the participant to receive knowledge as a gift from God. This knowledge both surpasses the limits of philosophy (human reason) and grounds (and justifies) the existence of knowledge arrived at by means of the human intellect. St. Justin declares: [T]he power of Truth, from the other side, responds to the powerlessness of man on this side. Transcendent Truth crosses the gulf, arrives on our side of it and reveals Itself— Himself—in the person of Christ, the God-man. In Him transcendent Truth becomes immanent in man. The God-man reveals the truth in and through Himself. He reveals it, not through thought or reason, but by the life that is His. He not only has the truth, He is Himself the Truth. In Him, Being and Truth are one. Therefore He, in His person, not only defines Truth but shows the way to it: he who abides in Him will know the Truth, and the Truth will make him free (cf. John 8:32) from sin, falsehood, and death.[28] The solution to our epistemic predicament, the inability to provide metatheoretical validation of one’s own epistemic theory, which man’s autonomous reason cannot obtain within its own sphere of reasoning, is a truth that is both personal and obtained through living a life of faith. It is a call to a radically different way of thinking about truth and knowledge. It is not another metatheoretic system. It is a person. It is Christ.
End Notes |
[1] In other papers, I refer to man’s attempt to provide a coherent account of knowledge and/or justify the existence of knowledge entirely in reference to man’s epistemic theories, the world, or logical space of reasons without appeal to God and His Revelation as autonomous epistemology. “By autonomous epistemology, I mean any attempt to construct a philosophical account of the world on the assumption that it is possible God does not exist or that it is possible for man to possess knowledge and give a coherent and justified account of this knowledge independent (autonomous) from the existence and revelation of God. Either one sees human reason as grounded in God’s revelation, the precondition for the possibility of any knowledge (theonomous epistemology), or one sees human reason as independent (autonomous).” (“The Reason for Reason,” 3)
[2] “[T]he metaepistemological problem does not jeopardise directly the validity of human knowledge – either in the sense of specific sciences or in the sense of the ordinary linguistico-doxastic activities and achievements of an individual – but that of a theory of knowledge; and as a petitio principii the metaepistemological problem does not render the justification of a theory of knowledge logically self-contradictory, but it does deprive the theory of its convincing power with respect to the sceptical attack.” Luciano Florididi, “The Problem of the Justification of a Theory of Knowledge,” 206-207.
[3] Duncan Pritchard, 32 What is This Thing Called Knowledge?, 32.
[4] “[T]he view is unsustainable because it is unclear how an infinite chain of grounds could justify a belief any more than an infinite series of foundations could ever support a house.” (Ibid., 33)
[5] Daniele Sgaravatti, “Foundations, circularity or both: reflections on the Agrippan trilemma in contemporary epistemology,” 2.
[6] Luciano Florididi, “The Problem of the Justification of a Theory of Knowledge,” 211.
[7] Chisholm’s principal analysis of the problem of the criterion is in ‘The Problem of the Criterion’, which first appeared as The Aquinas Lecture (Milwaukee: Marquette University Pub., 1973).
[8] “In one sense metaphysics is prior to knowledge, since it would be the ontological structures of the world that determine whether knowledge is possible, how it is acquired, and under what conditions knowledge is obtained. However, the difficulty is that one has to “know” what metaphysics is correct in order to determine what epistemological account is correct. In other words, since metaphysics will determine epistemology (how and what we can know), we will have to “know” (i.e., epistemology) what the correct metaphysics is first; however, we cannot answer the first part, without establishing a correct epistemology (the second part), and we cannot establish a correct epistemology (the second part) without establishing the first part, and so on. Therefore, autonomous man cannot make any justified claims that knowledge exists or claim to be in possession of knowledge…this dilemma occurs because of the finitude of man and the fact that he does not stand in an epistemic and metaphysically privileged position to resolve this dialectical tension between these two categories.” (“The Reason for Reason,” 5)
[9] “Consequently, autonomous epistemology either resorts to trivialness (i.e., knowledge exists if knowledge exists) or it assumes what it wants to prove (i.e., 2nd-order statements are assumed in order to prove 1st-order statements and 1st-order statements are assumed in order to prove 2nd-order statements), which is viciously circular and an example of epistemic bootstrapping.” (Ibid.)
[10] Of course the externalist will argue that this is placing an internalist constraint on the matter; however, this misses the larger point about the problems of metatheoretical validation, which will see later in this paper.
[11] This is related to the objection known as the generality problem. As Bonjour points out, the reliablist says, “a belief is justified if the general sort of cognitive process from which it results is reliable… But at what level of generality should the relevant process be characterized.” (Bonjour, Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses, 234)
[12] Ibid.
[13] “Without some way of answering this question in a specific and nonarbitrary way, the reliabilist has not succeeded in offering a definite position at all, but only a general schema that there is apparently no nonarbitrary way to make more definite.” (Ibid., 215)
[14]As Martin Nuhlicek states, “the reliability of a cognitive process is neither necessary, nor sufficient condition of justification, unless the subject herself is somehow involved in this matter.” (“Sceptical and Practical Criticisms of Epistemic Externalism,” 36)
[15] This is the simple modus tollens form: 1) p ⸧ q / 2) – q // 3) – p
[16] Another way to look at this through the modus tollens argument can be seen in the following:
- If the content of the Theory (what the theory is talking about) is true, then the Theory is true.
- The theory is not true.
- Therefore, the content of the theory is not true
[17] Lewis Carroll, “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles”. math.dartmouth.edu.(Retrieved 26 January 2025).
[18] Premise 1 is obviously an inference, since it is a proposition that states: “If K, then Kp.”
[19] Theories necessarily form propositions; and since inferential relations are always between items with propositional form, every theory will depend on inferences, especially when it comes to its own metatheoretical validation.
[20] Again, something like foundational externalism will claim that one can have knowledge (1st-order) and that if one can have 1st-order knowledge, it is possible to be justified in making 2nd-order claims that knowledge exists; however, because an epistemic theory relies on making propositions about knowledge and interferences to higher-order claims about knowledge, it will not be immune from the aforementioned critique. Furthermore, the metatheoretical claims can be substituted in the aforementioned argument to show that it relies on inference such that if foundational externalism is true, then knowledge exists (1st-order), but since this proposition (if p then q) implies the proposition “if p then q”, in order to confirm the first proposition, if p, then q, we will have to affirm an infinite amount of propositions about the previous propositions, we can never affirm that if foundational externalism is true, knowledge exists. Therefore, foundational externalism cannot establish that knowledge exists.
[21] St. Justin Popovich, “The Theory of Knowledge of St. Isaac the Syrian,” 67.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid. 67-68.
[25] Russell M. Manion, “The Contingency of Knowledge and Revelatory Theism,” 17.
[26] P1. It is either theonomous epistemology or autonomous epistemology
P2. If autonomous epistemology is true, then it is possible to make 2nd-order knowledge claims (e.g., knowledge exists) admitting that it is possible God (the necessary condition for knowledge) does not exist. [Definition of autonomous epistemology & rejection of Presuppositionalism]
P3. If autonomous epistemology is possible then it is possible that Revelatory Theism is false.
P4: It is either God (Revelatory Theism) or not God (not Revelatory Theism). [Exclusive Disjunction: (p∧¬q)∨(¬p∧q)]
P5: Not God (not Revelatory Theism) is accidentalism.
P6: Accidentalism makes knowledge impossible since there is no accidental knowledge. [Definition of knowledge]
C1: Therefore, not God (not Revelatory Theism) is false.
P7: However, if not God (not Revelatory Theism) is false (a defeater for knowledge and any knowledge claims), then God (Revelatory Theism) must be true. [Premise 4]
P8: But if God (Revelatory Theism) is necessarily true, then God must be the necessary condition of the possibility of knowledge. [Impossibility of the contrary].
P9: However, if God [Revelatory Theism] is the only necessary condition for the possibility knowledge, then autonomous epistemology implies that it is both possible that the necessary condition of knowledge exists and that is possible that it does not exist. [Contradiction]
C2: Therefore, autonomous epistemology is false.
C3: However, if autonomous epistemology is false, the Revelatory Theism must be true. [Exclusive Disjunction: (p∧¬q)∨(¬p∧q)]
[27] St. Justin Popovich, “The Theory of Knowledge of St. Isaac the Syrian,” 68.
[28] Ibid.
About the author
Fr. Deacon Ananias Sorem, PhD is CEO, Founder, and President of Patristic Faith. Father is an Orthodox apologist and Professor of Philosophy at Fullerton College and Carroll College. He has a BA in Liberal Arts from Thomas Aquinas College, together with an MA (Honors) and PhD in Philosophy (Epistemology; Philosophy of Science; Philosophy of Mind) from University College Dublin. His current academic work focuses on philosophical theology, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. Father is the author of several articles and peer-reviewed papers, including: “Searle, Materialism, and the Mind-Body Problem,” “Gnostic Scientism and Technocratic Totalitarianism,” “An Orthodox Approach to the Dangers of Modernity and Technology,” and “An Orthodox Theory of Knowledge: The Epistemological and Apologetic Methods of the Church Fathers.” He is also known for his YouTube channel, the Norwegian Nous, where he provides content on theology, apologetics, logic, and philosophy.
